Pandemics, climate and public finance: how to strengthen socio-economic resilience across policy domains by Battiston, Stefano et al.
Innovation in Business, Economics & Finance 1
ISBN [ebook] 978-88-6969-442-4
Peer review | Open access 259
Published 2020-07-31
© 2020  Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International Public License
DOI 10.30687/978-88-6969-442-4/019
A New World Post COVID-19
Lessons for Business, the Finance Industry and Policy Makers
edited by Monica Billio and Simone Varotto
Pandemics, Climate 
and Public Finance
How to Strengthen Socio-Economic 
Resilience across Policy Domains
Stefano Battiston
Università Ca’ Foscari Venezia, Italia; Universität Zürich, Schweiz
Monica Billio
Università Ca’ Foscari Venezia, Italia
Irene Monasterolo
Vienna University of Economics and Business, Austria; Boston University’s Global Development  
Policy Initiative, US; University of Zurich, Switzerland
Abstract The outbreak of COVID-19 and the containment measures are having an un-
precedented socio-economic impact in the European Union (EU) and elsewhere. The 
policies introduced so far in the EU countries promote a ‘business as usual’ economic re-
covery. This short-term strategy may jeopardise the mid-to-long-term sustainability and 
financial stability objectives. In contrast, strengthening the socio-economic resilience 
against future pandemics, as well as other shocks, calls for recovery measures that are 
fully aligned to the objectives of the EU Green Deal and of the EU corporate taxation policy. 
Tackling these long-term objectives is not more costly than funding the current short-term 
measures. Remarkably, it may be the only way to build resilience to future crises.
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1 Socio-Economic Impact of COVID-19: Is This Time 
Different?
Unprecedented socio-economic impact. Yet, are estimates too 
optimistic? The COVID-19 health crisis is playing a main role in to-
day’s policy, business and financial discussion. The COVID-19 epidem-
ics’ death and infection toll, and the measures (such as lockdown and 
social distancing) taken to mitigate it, are expected to drive major 
fiscal and macroeconomic impacts globally. In April 2020, the Inter-
national Monetary Fund (IMF) in its World Economic Outlook (IMF 
2020) projected the global economy to contract sharply by -3% in 
2020, much worse than during the 2008-09 financial crisis. Current 
impact and estimates of future impact are already very large. Yet, 
the estimates elaborated by the World Bank and the IMF are likely to 
be optimistic because they are based on the assumption that Gross 
Value Added of sectors such as tourism, remittance, and export will 
return to pre-COVID-19 levels by 2021.
Cascading shocks from local to global. The measures intro-
duced to contain the COVID-19 pandemic affected international and 
domestic demand triggering immediate demand and supply shocks 
on the local economy. In addition, they can induce cascading effects 
in the global economy and can be then transmitted to the financial 
sector with implications on financial stability. The COVID-19-induced 
economic crisis could lead to a new liquidity crisis and higher cost of 
debt, affecting public debt sustainability and inequality, in particu-
lar in low-income and emerging countries (Gallagher 2020). In turn, 
inequality contributes to accrue the COVID-19 crisis and its effects 
on the socio-economic and financial conditions (Ahmed et al. 2020). 
Further, FAO1 highlighted that the pandemic has increased the risk of 
food crises in 53 countries (representing 113 million people), many of 
which are already experiencing acute severe food insecurity. Similar 
food crises are likely in vulnerable communities already exposed to 
other crises (e.g. the Desert Locust outbreak in the Horn of Africa),2 
in Small Islands Developing States that depend on primary exports 
and tourism, and in countries relying on remittances. 
Is this time different? The COVID-19 crisis is the first large and 
global shock originating in the real economy since WWII and spread-
ing to the financial sector. Specific to this shock is that it has hit, at the 
same time, both the external and the internal demand sides of many 
countries for several months. In particular, shocks on tourism demand, 
Contributions: all authors contributed to the development of the paper idea and to ad-
dress the editor’s comments. Stefano Battiston and Irene Monasterolo wrote the paper.
1 http://www.fao.org/2019-ncov/q-and-a/impact-on-food-and-agriculture/en/.
2 http://www.fao.org/news/story/en/item/1258877/icode/.
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export prices and remittances affected firms’ production, employment, 
nominal wages and households’ income. The shock on internal demand 
was then amplified by domestic lockdown measures, triggering self-
reinforcing supply and demand side dynamics. There has been a loss 
of social, intellectual and financial capital. For instance, when a sub-
stantial number of firms, large and small, default, and production stalls 
for a few months, an important portion of a country’s economic infra-
structure may become severely compromised. This is in stark contrast 
with the estimates of standard economic models where shocks are id-
iosyncratic and their impact is fully reversible. In contrast, the socio-
economic impact of the COVID-19 shock appears to be persistent and 
self-reinforcing, as analysed more in detail below.
2 The Fiscal and Monetary Policy Response
In this section, we report on the main policy measures introduced 
by several countries to mitigate the socio-economic impact of the 
COVID-19 shock, and will focus on fiscal and monetary policies in-
troduced in the EU. This information serves as background for the 
policy analysis in Section 3.
A wide range of proposals to finance the recovery. It has been 
recently highlighted that the speed and duration of the COVID-19 eco-
nomic recovery will depend on the breadth and scope of emergency 
government funding (Toporowski, Calvert Jump 2020). In this regard, 
several proposals to finance the COVID-19 recovery have been put 
forward, including: coronavirus bonds3 and a Covid Credit Line4 with-
in the European Stability Mechanism (in Bénassy-Quéré et al. 2020); 
enhanced central banks’ purchasing programmes; liquidity lifelines 
(Brunnermeier et al. 2020) to overcome firms’ liquidity shortages; cen-
tral banks’ helicopter money (Couppey-Soubeyran 2020; Galí 2020); 
and the expansion of the role and scope of international financial in-
stitutions such as the European Investment Bank (EIB) in the EU.
Fiscal policies. Governments both in high-income and develop-
ing countries have introduced various forms of fiscal policies. These 
include increased healthcare spending, reduction or deferred pay-
ment of some taxes, credit support guarantees to companies, expan-
sion of unemployment benefits and income support, payroll support 
to the affected sectors (such as tourism) just to name a few. Such 
measures have contributed to smoothing the negative impacts of the 
COVID-19 lockdown measures on demand and supply (Monasterolo, 
Billio, Battiston 2020). The breadth and scope of the measures vary 
3 A proposal by Giavazzi, Tabellini 2020.
4 A proposal by Bénassy-Quéré et al. 2020.
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significatively across countries. In low income and emerging coun-
tries, the level of government spending ranged from 0.5% of GDP in 
Kenya to over 5% of GDP in the Philippines, dwarfing the financial 
support provided by development banks (e.g. the World Bank) during 
the COVID-19 crisis. In contrast, in advanced economies, COVID-19 
fiscal spending was the highest in Germany, where it reached 12% 
of (2019) GDP, followed by the US (9.1%), Japan (7%), the UK (4.5%) 
and China (4%). In the EU, the European Commission (EC) launched: 
1. a €540 billion support to the EU member states via the Euro-
pean Stability Mechanism (ESM) (up to 2% of 2019 GDP for 
each euro area country, based on existing precautionary es-
timates) to finance health related spending; 
2. €25 billion in government guarantees to the European Invest-
ment Bank (EIB) to provide up to €200 billion of financial sup-
port to corporations, and a €100 billion temporary loan-based 
instrument (SURE) to protect workers and jobs. 
3. In addition, €37 billion of the EU Budget (about and 0.3% of 
2019 EU27 GDP) was mobilised to extend the scope of the EU 
Solidarity Fund to incentivize banks to provide liquidity to 
small and medium enterprises and mid caps (as a guarantee 
to the European Investment Fund). Further, it is also aimed to 
support credit holidays to crisis-affected debtors, and to pro-
vide macro-financial assistance to ten countries included in 
the EU Enlargement and Neighborhood Partnership.5 
4. The EC also enabled EU member states to compensate com-
panies for the damage directly caused by COVID-19, includ-
ing measures in sectors such as aviation and tourism. Overall, 
the national liquidity measures, including schemes approved 
under temporary, flexible, EU State Aid rules, could lead to 
support funding up to a total of €2.9 trillion.
Monetary policies. Given the low interest rate environment, cen-
tral banks around the world have engaged in asset purchasing pro-
grammes, refinancing operations, and foreign exchange operations. 
For example, the ECB has taken action on several fronts: it has (i) 
expanded the asset purchase programme of private and public sec-
tor securities (Pandemic Emergency Purchase Program, PEPP) to 
€ 1.35 trillion until at least June 2021; (ii) revised the Non-Perform-
ing Loans and prudential floor to banks’ current minimum capital re-
quirements; (iii) provided more favourable terms and new liquidity 
facilities within the existing targeted longer-term refinancing opera-
tions and a new liquidity facility (PELTRO) of non-targeted Pandemic 
Emergency Longer-Term Refinancing Operations; (iv) grandfathered 
5 https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/node_en.
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until September 2021 the eligibility of marketable assets used as col-
lateral in Eurosystem credit operations falling below current mini-
mum credit quality requirements of ‘BBB-’; (v) expanded the range 
of eligible assets under the CSPP, and relaxed collateral standards 
for Eurosystem refinancing operations (MROs, LTROs, TLTROs) to 
include Greek sovereign bonds; (vi) allowed institutions6 to operate 
temporarily below the Pillar 2 Guidance (P2G) with regard to the cap-
ital conservation buffer and the liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) of the 
Basel III agreement on bank regulation. 
3 Mind the Gap: Misalignment of Current Policies  
with the EU Green Deal and EU Tax Policies
Climate action. The policy measures discussed above could help to 
mitigate the effects of the lockdown and help the economy to bounce 
back in the short-term. However, in the long term, they could also neg-
atively impact on the achievement of the global climate targets (i.e. the 
Paris Agreement aimed to keep the global temperature increase be-
low 2 degrees Celsius with respect to pre-industrial times) and the ob-
jectives of the EC Sustainable Finance Action Plan,7 aimed to align fi-
nance to sustainability. Achieving these objectives is also at the heart 
of the 2019 EU Green Deal program.8 Fiscal measures that provide 
tax reductions or exemptions to firms that either base their profits on 
fossil fuels or carbon intensive activities (e.g. fossil fuels extraction, 
traditional automotive), without any conditionality (e.g. on the decar-
bonization of their business), contribute to the misalignment of the 
economies with respect to the climate targets and objectives of the 
EU Green Deal programme. This, in turn, makes the risk of carbon 
stranded assets9 more material. Indeed, as shown by Battiston et al. 
(2017), investors’ portfolios are largely exposed to carbon stranded 
assets and, more generally, to Climate Policy Relevant Sectors (CPRS 
i.e. sectors of economic activity that are affected positively or nega-
tively by a late and sudden transition to a low-carbon economy).
CPRS represent also a large share of the ECB’s expansionary mon-
etary policy as already shown in the context of the ECB’s CSPP QE 







9 Stranded assets are assets subject to write-downs or devaluations caused by new 
climate policies (see van der Ploeg, Rezai 2020). 
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should signal the importance of decarbonizing portfolios to support 
the EU Green Deal programme. This would contribute to rewarding 
the firms that demonstrates progress in the low-carbon transition rel-
ative to their own sector of economic activity, rather than only penal-
ising all carbon intensive firms.
The misalignment of asset purchases contributes to (i) widen the 
gap between the COVID-19 recovery and the governments’ climate 
pledges (e.g. the Paris Agreement and the Green Deal programme 
in the EU), (ii) foster the realisation of carbon stranded assets in the 
economy, (iii) reverse years of ‘signalling’ by central banks and fi-
nancial regulators engaged in supporting climate related financial 
disclosure, e.g. within the premises of the Network for Greening the 
Financial System (NGFS) (NGFS 2019). Further, by reducing cap-
ital requirements for credit institutions, and by revising the Non-
Performing Loans regulation, without conditioning these measures 
to countercyclical capital accumulation and to the decarbonization 
of their balance sheets, the recovery measures counteract the reg-
ulatory efforts introduced after the 2008 financial crisis aimed to 
strengthen financial stability. 
4 COVID-19 Recovery and Climate Mitigation:  
A Role for Policy Complementarity?
An approach to operationalize EU solidarity in response to the 
COVID-19 crisis, while exploiting ways to address the impending 
climate crisis, has been proposed by Monasterolo and Volz (2020). 
For EU member states with low fiscal space and high debt, financ-
ing the COVID-19 response is perceived to have higher priority than 
the EU’s climate targets. The proposal foresees the coordinated issu-
ance of COVID-related bonds by the EC as well as Green Deal bonds 
by the EIB. The EC issues COVID crisis-conditioned bonds, avail-
able for purchase by private and public investors. The bonds pro-
ceeds are to be used exclusively for funding an immediate response 
across the Union to alleviate the socio-economic impact of the pan-
demic. At the same time, the EIB issues new Green Deal bonds that 
support projects in the COVID-19 recovery phase via structural in-
vestments aligned with the Green Deal carbon neutrality targets. 
The Green Deal bonds could be used to finance both climate-aligned 
private investments as well as strategic pan-EU infrastructure in-
vestment, at low cost, to support the recovery phase in all member 
countries. The proposal by Monasterolo and Volz has three interest-
ing features. First, it provides a ‘common debt instrument’ that does 
not generate a moral hazard by individual member countries (since 
it is conditional to the COVID-19 response). Second, it would avoid 
compromises between using scarce national finances for either the 
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COVID-19 response measures or Green Deal investments. This would 
ease the public debt burden of member states, thus preserving finan-
cial stability at the individual country and Eurozone level. Third, it 
would foster a deeper integration of EU institutions and coherence of 
EU funding programmes with the Green Deal objectives. This would 
open the way to a responsible shared management of these funding 
programmes and objectives among member states and generations.
Deepening fiscal inequality: why it matters for public debt 
sustainability. An important debate is emerging about the relation 
between taxation policies and the economic recovery. Many firms 
that are benefitting from fiscal measures introduced in EU countries 
belong to holdings or groups which have fiscal residency in countries 
with very low effective tax rates (such as The Netherlands, Luxem-
bourg, Ireland or Switzerland).10 Using a wide range of legal strate-
gies, multinational enterprises are able to shift profits from the coun-
try where the revenues are generated to a country with a very low 
effective tax rate. The problem is well-known and long standing. In 
the aftermath of the 2009 financial crisis, because of the strain on 
public finances, an OECD/G20 project called “Base Erosion and Prof-
it Shifting” (BEPS)11 was created. “Multinational enterprises exploit 
gaps and mismatches in the international tax rules to artificially shift 
profits to low or no tax jurisdictions and avoid paying their fair share 
of tax”.12 When these strategies are legal, the practice goes under 
the name of tax avoidance. The 2016 Panama Papers scandals led to 
renewed efforts in the EU on combating tax avoidance. Remarkably, 
the Public-Country-by-Country Reporting (CBCR) directive was re-
jected by the EU Council thanks to the vote of the member states 
with low taxation regimes. The directive would have mandated mul-
tinational companies to disclose key fiscal financial information of 
their subsidiaries by country (Garicano 2019). 
In the context of the COVID-19 recovery, there is a concern that 
firms benefitting from public aid in a country in which they generate 
revenues will avoid taxation by shifting elsewhere their profits. The 
phenomenon results in an unintended cross-border subsidy and con-
tributes to increasing the inequality between countries. In the EU, 
this phenomenon is particularly relevant because it works against 
the EU Cohesion Policy, which represents now the largest item on 
the EU budget. The aim of the EU Cohesion policy is to narrow the 
inequality gap by fostering the economic convergence of EU regions. 
It is important to notice that all EU countries, including those with 
10 For a review of the top ten tax haven see e.g. Zuckman, Wright 2018.
11 https://www.oecd.org/about/impact/combatinginternationaltaxavoid-
ance.htm.
12 Cf. footnote 9.
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low taxation, benefit from the EU Cohesion Policy. Conversely, even 
countries that are damaged by this fiscal dumping (e.g. Italy) large-
ly contribute to the funds of the EU Cohesion policy. There is thus a 
double negative distributive effect.
5 Doing More and Better Does not Cost More:  
Policy Complementarity is a Matter  
of Understanding and Management
As we have discussed above, the fiscal and monetary policies intro-
duced so far in the EU countries promote a ‘business as usual’ eco-
nomic recovery. This is a short-term strategy that may jeopardise the 
mid-to-long-term environmental sustainability and financial stability 
objectives. In particular, the fiscal measures introduced so far ham-
per the climate policy measures and halt the already difficult progress 
on tax transparency. Indeed, the problem of reconciling taxation fair-
ness, efforts to restart the economy and climate change have been 
recently explicitly discussed by the EU Commissioner for Economy.13 
Perhaps, the most important thing to realise is that a short-term 
approach to the COVID-19 response that does not consider the cli-
mate and the taxation issues are more costly and less effective than 
tackling these issues together. Indeed, we can choose between fi-
nancing now a carbon intensive economic recovery (i.e. supporting 
firms unconditionally to their decarbonization efforts) and later a 
low-carbon transition (thus paying twice), or to finance right away a 
green economic recovery (thus paying only once), exploiting creative 
destruction in the Schumpeterian sense. Similarly, governments can 
choose to give state aid to firms that engage in tax avoidance strat-
egies. In this case, they will face the continued reduced income tax 
resulting from profit shifting (thus paying twice). Alternatively, they 
can choose to resolve this taxation policy issue right away and reduce 
tax income losses in the future (thus paying only once). 
To conclude, strengthening the socio-economic resilience against 
future pandemics, as well as other future shocks, calls for recovery 
measures that are fully aligned to the objectives of the EU Green 
Deal and of the EU corporate taxation policy. Tackling these objec-
tives together is more cost effective than addressing the COVID-19 
crisis with short-term measures. Remarkably, because of the inter-
connectedness between climate risk, pandemic risk and financial risk 
(Monasterolo, Billio, Battiston 2020), this may be actually the only 
feasible way to build resilience to future crises. 
13 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/SPEECH_20_398.
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